In seeking to maintain their power, many African regimes rely on strategies of extraversion, converting their dependent relations with the external world into domestic resources and authority. This article assesses the relationship between extraversion and political liberalization, a dimension of African democratization that has been somewhat underappreciated in recent empirical studies. African countries vary in their extraversion portfolios, or the dimensions of their relations to the outside world that they can instrumentalize, and these variations correspond both to different degrees of vulnerability to the demands of foreign donors and to different preferences from the donors themselves. We find four quantitative measures of extraversion vulnerability to be statistically associated with the initial transitions of the 1989-1995 period and with the 'consolidations' at different levels of democracy observable between 1995 and 2011. These findings shed new light on both democratic and hybrid regime trajectories in Africa.
MOST EMPIRICAL STUDIES of the determinants of political liberalization in Africa have focused on domestic variables, such as protest, the institutional features of previous regimes, the number of elections, the availability of oil rents, or the nature and structure of political parties.
1 Few, in contrast, have given consideration to international factors. When they have, their results have been mixed and often inconclusive. Of the eight quantitative studies on democratization we surveyed, dating from 1997 to 2007, three made no mention of international factors. 2 Three included control variables for foreign aid, the number of structural adjustment programmes, and oil exports, but obtained insignificant and/or inconsistent results.
3 Two explicitly focused on foreign aid but did so from the perspective of the effectiveness of donor policies without articulating the positive effects they found in terms of African political dynamics. 4 In contrast, no study so far has analysed empirically the impact of the international relations of African states on their propensity to liberalize. 5 This is puzzling, for there is a theoretically rich body of scholarship on the extent to which African regimes instrumentalize their external relations and dependence for domestic benefits. 6 The potential impact of such 'extraversion' strategies on political liberalization has not been studied systematically so far.
In this article we take a closer look at the relationship between extraversion and political liberalization. While extraversion per se is difficult to measure, African countries vary in the dimensions of the external relations that they can instrumentalize for domestic political and material benefits, with some having more options -more diversified extraversion portfolios -than others. In this respect, we hypothesize that the greater a portfolio's dependence on foreign donors, or the less control a regime has over the options in its portfolio, the more vulnerable it might be to donor demands for democratization. Thus, the likelihood of liberalization might be a function of the vulnerability of a country's extraversion portfolio. Such vulnerability might change over time, however, and it might interact with donors' own dynamics and constraints to help account for variations in patterns of liberalization across the continent.
In order to test this hypothesis, we collected data on different dimensions of African regimes' external relations, and on domestic variables usually associated with political liberalization. Unlike other studies of African democratization, we ran quantitative tests on two distinct periods that characterize Africa's path of political liberalization. The first period, from 1989 to 1995, saw a rapid positive average change in the level of democracy across the continent. The second period, after 1995, witnessed much greater stagnation, albeit at different levels of liberalization -that is, many regimes consolidating at whatever level of democracy they had reached by 1995. Rather than thinking of liberalization as one continuous linear path from 1989 onwards, which does not correspond to reality, we suggest that the strength of a theory could be assessed by the extent to which it can account for both phases.
Our results indicate that the vulnerability to donors of extraversion portfolios contributes significantly to variations in political liberalization within Africa, both with respect to initial transitions and subsequent 'consolidations'. In the next section, we begin by detailing the two phases of political liberalization in Africa. We then discuss the notions of extraversion, extraversion portfolios, and vulnerability, and use some historical examples to illustrate their possible linkage to political liberalization. Finally, we turn to the statistical analysis and the discussion of our findings.
Patterns of African liberalization
On average, African regimes displayed rapid improvements in democracy from 1989 to 1995, followed by overall stagnation thereafter. While this overall 'end of transition' pattern is well known, 7 a more detailed look reveals that the initial transition itself differed broadly across countries, from radical democratization to increased authoritarianism, and that the subsequent 'consolidation' has largely taken place at all levels of democracy. In other words, the 2011 regime distribution across the continentwith nine 'free', 23 'partly free', and 16 'not free' countries -has been steady for almost two decades. 8 About 90 percent of the countries that were democratic in 1995 were still democratic in 2011, and about 75 percent of the partly free ones were still partly free. Altogether, some 68 percent of democratic change across the continent between 1989 and 2011 can be imputed to changes between 1989 and 1995. 9 While it is not unusual for regime characteristics to correlate over time within regions, such consolidation is surprising in Africa, not only because its more democratic regimes endure despite missing several of the alleged prerequisites of democracy (like sufficient income levels), but also because its 'hybrid' regimes seem to be in a state of equilibrium, neither transitioning towards more democracy nor reverting to the full-fledged authoritarianism they displayed before the 1990s. It is typical of these regimes that they hold regular elections and provide their citizens with some liberties, while nevertheless using autocratic and clientelistic means to maintain their effective monopoly over power.
10 Thus, the large proportion of partly free or hybrid countries in Africa (at 48 percent the largest of any region in the world) has become a steady feature of its regime distribution rather than a stage in the continent's course towards or away from democracy. Figure 1 illustrates this empirical pattern, highlighting the trajectories of five groups of countries which differed in their initial transitions and subsequently stayed by and large where they ended up in 1995. Breaking down the pattern by group highlights the degree to which country experiences are similar within each group.
The 'consistent democrats' are the countries that had multi-party political systems before 1989 and throughout the transition periodBotswana, Mauritius, and Senegal -as well as Namibia (which became independent as a democratic country in 1991) and South Africa (for which we do not include data before the end of apartheid). The essential feature of these countries is their constant level of democracy: they are solidly democratic throughout the transition and after.
The second group, 'strong liberalizers', consists of countries that increased at least 3 points in the Freedom House (FH) average score for civil liberties and political rights between 1989 and 1995, which guarantees a jump from one category to another (from Not Free to Partly Free or from Partly Free to Free). They are Benin, Cape Verde, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, and the Seychelles. Aside from Malawi, which later fell back by one point and where democratic rights came under considerable threat during the second Bingu presidency, these countries all stayed where they were as of 1995, or continued to improve. Mali did, however, experience a coup in March 2012, one month before scheduled presidential elections, by elements of the military disgruntled by their combat conditions against a Tuareg insurgency in the north. After unanimous pressure from donors and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and stunning military losses to the insurgents, the mutineers seemingly returned power to civilians in April and elections were rescheduled for later that year.
The third group consists of countries that showed a small (1 to 2.5 points) initial improvement. Their transition tended to be shorter and was largely over by 1992. This is the largest group. It comprises Angola, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. Ghana alone has since become democratic and, together with Tanzania, is one of only two countries among this group to show improvement after the initial transition, eventually climbing by 3 points.
A similar pattern is visible among the category of countries that displays no net change in the initial period (a few of them display a small positive change between 1989 and 1992, followed by a reversal before 1995). By and large, nothing happens to them subsequently either, although their average creeps up from close to 2 to close to 3. These countries are Burundi, Cameroon, Congo-Kinshasa, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.
The last group consists of countries that had an initial negative change. They moved in the opposite direction from the rest of the continent during the 1989-95 period. On average, they ended in 1995 about a point and a half below their 1989 level. Unlike other groups that stayed flat, they subsequently recouped their losses and eventually converged with countries that had shown an original small gain. Although they do display change after 1995, it should be stressed that they stabilized around their original level of democracy pre-transition. Several of these countries actually experienced civil conflict or other forms of state failure in the initial transition, which was responsible for their drop. Post-conflict multilateral interventions and donor-sponsored elections were largely responsible for their subsequent catch-up. These countries are the Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. Nigeria experienced a dictatorial drift after 1993, followed by a later trend towards partial liberalization after 1998.
With very few exceptions, each category displays a pattern of consolidation at its own 1995 level of democracy. Initial change largely predicts overall change. Of course, variations remain within each group. The later transitions of Ghana and Tanzania stand out among the hybrid category. Yet, this within-group variation is much smaller than between groups. In other words, the aggregation of countries by initial transition explains more variation than there is within each group. We show this in Table 1 with an analysis of variance. Comparing FH scores as of 2011, the between-group variation is more than 15 times bigger than the within-group variation. If we compare instead overall change in the scores between 1989 and 2011, the ratio is about 8. Both ratios are very statistically significant.
Extraversion portfolios
One challenge to understanding the distribution of regime type in Africa lies in reconciling the similarity of politics across the continent with the Most of them also engage in foreign relations based on seeking the patronage of rich countries, offering diplomatic allegiance and strategic benefits in exchange for resources, political support, and non-interference in domestic affairs.
12 More specifically, as Jean-François Bayart has identified and articulated, historically most African governments have gained, consolidated, or maintained their power and resources by following policies of 'extraversion'.
13 According to this hypothesis, African ruling elites employ their dependent relationship with the external world to appropriate resources and authority in order to establish or reinforce their power over domestic competitors. In the course of history, such strategies of extraversion have included the domestic instrumentalization by some elites of slavery, colonization, development aid, commodity exports, structural adjustment programmes, and more. In Frederick Cooper's words, African states are 'gatekeepers', sitting 'astride an interface between a territory and the rest of the world, collecting and distributing resources that [derive] from the gate itself'. 14 Differences in regime type across the continent do not reflect differences in the degree to which regimes are patrimonial or rely on strategies of extraversion. By and large, it can be argued that they all are and they all do. 15 Together with the sweeping nature of the extraversion argument, this lack of measurable variation makes for difficult operationalization and testing. There are, however, observable variations in the specific elements of their foreign relations that regimes instrumentalize as part of their extraversion strategies. We can think of each country as having a unique extraversion portfolio made up of the specific linkages with the international system that its regime can exploit to extract abroad the resources it needs for domestic domination. As part of its portfolio the Chadian government, for example, instrumentalizes its underdevelopment for foreign aid. But it also maintains close diplomatic ties with its former colonizer, France, for whose armed forces it provides a base on its territory. It also has geo-strategic importance in the context of the Darfur conflict in Sudan. And, finally, it is an oil exporter. At different times, it can rely on one or the other (or several) of these extraversion assets. The specific balance of its portfolio gives the Chadian government considerable flexibility and relative autonomy from the specific political demands of donors, such as democratization. In contrast, the rulers of a country like Benin have few avenues for appropriating international resources for their benefit. Like most African regimes, they can capitalize on their country's underdevelopment to invite aid flows. Aside from that, they can only offer political concessions -apparent regime change itself -for additional revenue. In other words, their extraversion portfolio is significantly more vulnerable to donor demands than Chad's.
Extraversion portfolio vulnerability and the degree of initial liberalization
The most easily identifiable dimensions of extraversion might be alignment with an international patron, reliance on foreign aid in exchange for the adoption of policies recommended by donors, and participation in world trade as a primary commodity producer. Because of their salience and relative ease of measurement, these are the dimensions on which we focus.
Extraversion portfolio diversification became particularly important at the end of the Cold War, when several countries lost their Soviet patron, and the United States and some European donors departed from their support of allies in the region and began making demands for democratization. 16 Countries which relied on Cold War patronage (from the East or the West) or had grown dependent on international aid over other sources of domestic authority, became increasingly vulnerable to donor demands. 17 Those with greater leverage, such as natural resource endowment, were more immune to the prevailing changes and better able to resist pressures for liberalization.
Allegiance to a disappearing or changing patron might well have been the most important of these factors. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European communist regimes dealt a severe blow to the single-party African regimes that were Soviet clients and relied on similar ideologies for their domestic domination. For the 13 African Soviet clients identified by Thad Dunning, 18 we found that the average time from the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989 to the adoption of multi-party politics was 14 months. For other African countries, it was 33 months.
The number of former Soviet clients is indeed particularly high among the strongest democratizers. The Benin regime had adopted Marxism-Leninism in the 1970s. It abandoned it in December 1989.
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Although most of its aid came from Western donors, Cape Verde too had been a client of the Soviet Union, from which it received technical assistance. Mali also had 'extensive and long-standing' ties to the communist bloc 20 . The Mozambican government, engaged in civil war since 1975, was dependent on the Soviet Union for military equipment and oil. It too dropped Marxism-Leninism in 1989 and announced the adoption of a multi-party system in July 1990. In São Tomé, Manuel Pinto da Costa had allied his regime to Angola and the Eastern Bloc, although a rapprochement with the West had begun in 1987. The Seychelles' President, France Albert René, had public affinities with North Korea, where he went on four official visits, and was a protégé of the Soviets.
The post-1989 shift affected countries on both sides of the Cold War. Malawi, for example, was a staunch anti-communist Western client whose regime had been sympathetic to white rule in Rhodesia and South Africa. Yet President Kamazu Banda's stock with the West diminished considerably with the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the apartheid regime in 1991, and donors turned on him, suspending all nonhumanitarian aid in 1992 for human rights abuses 21 . That same year, Banda agreed to a referendum on a multi-party system, losing both this and the subsequent May 1994 elections.
In contrast, French patronage did not require costly adjustments. For sure, France demanded some political changes of its African clients, especially after the La Baule Franco-African summit of June 1990, but France did not disappear and its Africa policy continued to be based on considerations other than just democracy promotion. Mali provides a useful illustration. Being also a client of France, which subsidized its day-to-day operations including most of its civil-service payroll, the Malian government was initially able to reject demands for multi-party politics. Yet, when the French government formally declared its expectations of democracy among aid recipients, the Traoré regime was further weakened. Lacking the tools of accommodation, Moussa Traoré responded with violence. About 100 demonstrators were killed in two days before the army took over in March 1991. Although the new head of state, Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) initially hoped to stay in power, he was warned by donors and relented after a week. 22 Other French clients, particularly those well endowed in natural resources like Cameroon or Gabon, or those with a more strategic location like Chad or Djibouti, faced significantly less pressure from Paris to democratize, or were better able to resist it.
For several African countries, the financial resources from the West also acquired greater importance after 1989 and came with new, explicitly democratic conditions. Benin, for example, dropped its one-party system the same month that France agreed to pay some of its civil service arrears in exchange for political reforms. 23 Yet, most studies that have looked at the impact of aid dependence on democratization have not found significant effects. All of them, however, have measured it in per capita terms or as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). These measures might be poor proxies for the role of aid in extraversion strategies. From the point of view of incumbent elites, one of aid's main benefits is access to cash. The extent to which such access matters to a regime is a function of what other sources of cash it can rely on. Calculating aid as a percentage of GDP does not necessarily capture this dimension of need. Two countries can have identical aid ratios to GDP. Yet, one country's GDP might rely largely on exports and thus provide ample cash, while another might depend more on subsistence farming, and thus present government with fewer avenues for access to foreign exchange. Aid would be more important in the extraversion portfolio of the latter country. Measuring aid in proportion to export revenues captures the relative importance of aid cash and draws sharp distinctions. Countries that improved their FH score by at least 3 points during the transition period had a ratio of aid to exports averaging 5.7 (their aid receipts were almost 6 times as large as the value of their exports). In Cape Verde and São Tomé, the ratio was as high as 18.5 and 9.9. But this was not merely a small-country effect: it also reached 7.9 in Mozambique. In contrast, the ratios were 1.6 for those countries with a 1-2.5 point improvement in FH scores, and 1.5 for those with none.
Countries that could rely on significant revenues from commodity exports probably experienced less liberalization pressure, especially when donors were the destination of their exports. Because of its strategic role, oil is usually the most important commodity in this respect. Although there were relatively few significant African oil exporters in the 1989-95 period, the strong liberalizer group did not include any of the five countries whose rents from oil exports (the value per capita of their export revenue over the cost per capita of their oil production) amounted to more than 1 percent of GDP.
24 Angola, Congo, and Gabon each experienced limited liberalization (rapidly reversed in the first two cases). As of 2012, their leader was either the same as during the transition period (Angola, Congo) or his son (Gabon). Cameroon did not liberalize at all: Paul Biya maintained himself in power through repression and fraudulent elections in 1992 and thereafter. Nigeria organized tightly controlled elections in 1993. When their result displeased the military leadership, they cancelled them.
In all these cases, resource-dependent donors facilitated political stagnation. For example, the democratization pressure exercised by France on Benin and Mali contrasted with the more lenient French attitude towards Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon, where French companies were involved in oil exploitation. 25 Similarly, both the United States and the European Union failed to implement strict conditions on their aid to Nigeria during the return to military rule in 1993 because of their oil interests in the country.
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It appears therefore that vulnerability of extraversion portfolios to democratization pressures was not uniformly distributed across Africa. Partly as a result, the trajectories regimes experienced immediately after the Cold War differed substantially. Earlier studies have pointed this logic out, at least as a partial explanation, but without finding or providing empirical evidence for it. 27 In the next two sections, we look at 'consolidations' and focus on the two most paradoxical categories of countries: those that strongly liberalized between 1989 and 1995 and have remained largely democratic, and those that have consolidated as hybrid regimes.
Vulnerable extraversion portfolios and sustained liberalization
By the standards of conventional democratization theory, which stresses the role of per capita income in facilitating democratic transitions and consolidations, the sustained liberalization of very poor countries like Benin, Cape Verde, Mali, Mozambique, or São Tomé is somewhat paradoxical. It is possible, however, that these countries and others that liberalized most forcefully in the early 1990s have remained more democratic at least in part because of the continued vulnerability of their extraversion portfolios and the capacity of their rulers to benefit from reforms. Not only has the relative importance of aid and commodity exports in their portfolio remained largely unchanged in that period, but several of these regimes have also experienced domestic crises that have kept them relatively weak and dependent towards foreign donors and patrons. In Benin, President Soglo faced constitutional crises, mutinies, the consequences of the 1994 CFA Franc devaluation, and ongoing strikes and student protests. In Mali (which also endured the CFA devaluation), the Tuareg rebellion continued throughout the Konaré and ATT presidencies, keeping the regime fragile and dependent on outside military support (including from the US).
28 Debt servicing in all these countries also remained contingent on continued donor assistance. In Mozambique, donor conditionality might have increased rather than easing up after the initial transition. Because the country democratized as part of its peace process, donors were possibly initially less demanding and became more conditional in matters of governance after the initial elections, which might have contributed to keeping FRELIMO committed to the reforms. Cape Verde and São Tomé remained for their part exceedingly dependent on foreign aid, with aid-to-export ratios over the 1996-2008 period averaging 9.1 and 6.6 respectively. Certainly both deserve the label of 'unviable state', which São Tomé has earned from its reliance on external sources of financial support.
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But it is not enough to demonstrate that regimes are vulnerable to explain their democratic performance in an extraversion framework. They must also be able to instrumentalize democracy to their own benefit, for the success of an extraversion strategy is measured by the capacity of incumbents to stay in power. While consolidating formal democratic gains seems particularly risky for elites interested in remaining in power, ruling elites in most of the strongest liberalizers were in fact able to either stay in or rapidly return to power under the new democratic dispensations. As Nicolas van de Walle has noted, 'at the end of 2002, the single party in power before 1989 remained there in 15 of the region's multiparty political systems'.
30 In other words, being able to navigate the formal trappings of democracy afforded them both international support, 28. It is in part the lack of sufficient military support to deal with a surge in the Tuareg insurgency (recently reinforced with fighters returned from Lybia) that led some low-ranking officers to stage a coup in March 2012. In the face of rising odds of dying in combat (dozens of troops had been massacred by rebels earlier in the year), the relative benefits of extraversion fell dramatically for these soldiers. 29. Jedrzej Frynas, Geoffrey Wood, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, 'Business and politics in São Tomé e Príncipe: from cocoa monoculture to petro-state', African Affairs 102, 406 (2003), pp. 51-80. 30. van de Walle, 'Presidentialism', p. 300. as they were playing by the new rules, as well as the personal political and economic rewards that come with holding significant positions of domestic power.
Thus, among the strongest liberalizers, we find several cases of elites manoeuvring their way back into positions of power even after they were removed from office during the initial transition period. Mathieu Kérékou was re-elected President of Benin in 1996 and again in 2001. 31 The ruling party from 1975 to 1990 returned to power in Cape Verde in 2001. In Mali, ATT, who had hoped to seize power by force in 1991 but then had to relinquish it under significant donor and social pressure, was back at the helm through elections in 2002 and was re-elected in 2007.
In many cases, democracy became a viable strategy for ruling elites to remain in power and, in some cases, afforded them even more job security. In Mozambique, FRELIMO won the elections and never lost power (or the war). Not only did democratization help bring an end to the war, but it also reinforced FRELIMO's territorial control and its power over its domestic opponent RENAMO, 32 while unleashing very significant aid flows in this resource-poor economy, where more than 50 percent of the budget is funded by donors. If anything, FRELIMO reinforced its monopoly of power in the democratic era, particularly after the replacement (in 2004) of Joaquim Alberto Chissano by Armando Guebuza, who has presided over a return to party precedence over the state.
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In São Tomé, the former ruling party was again the dominant party in Parliament by 1994, and its leader was Prime Minister. Although São Tomé has seen frequent changes in parliamentary majorities since 1991, politics has remained the preserve of a tiny elite. 34 In Cape Verde, too, a small group of people has shared power. Pedro Pires, the current President, was also Prime Minister from 1975 to 1991. Finally, in Seychelles René never lost the presidency and managed to increase the number of terms he was eligible for. He finally stepped down in 2004. In such environments, consolidating democracy is hardly a risky strategy for the elite.
Democracy also provides ruling coalitions with material benefits. Although democratic African countries tend to be less corrupt than other countries, they are far from corruption-free and do not necessarily show 31. There are other facets to Kérékou's propensity for extraversion. In addition to his successive commitments to Marxism-Leninism and democracy, he converted to Islam in 1980 (following the rise in oil prices) before becoming a born-again Christian in the 1990s. 35 In Benin, Nassirou Arifari writes of continued 'extortion' by the authorities. 36 In Mozambique, Joseph Hanlon notes that corruption grew rapidly in the 1990s. 37 As illustrated by Table 2 , corruption has remained relatively high in most democratic countries (worsening in Benin, Mali, and the Seychelles), which supports an inference that elites continue to appropriate resources and thus find an instrumental interest in maintaining democracy (unfortunately, no data on corruption are available for all these countries prior to 1996).
The expectation of political and material benefits from democratization is by no means confined to African regimes. Joseph Wright finds that democracy-conditional foreign aid is most likely to become the impetus for liberalization in settings where the authoritarian regime's tenure will be least threatened by democratization.
38 These regimes, he notes, find it in their interest to democratize to gain access to foreign finance, while they maintain job security. By and large, therefore, the consolidation of 
Limited vulnerability and donor ambivalence: making sense of hybrid consolidations
The logic of hybrid consolidation might not be all that different, with the distinction that hybrids possibly remain less vulnerable over time to donor conditionality. They might have more access to alternative sources of revenue, be generally less dependent on foreign aid, and, as a group, comprise fewer former Soviet clients. Moreover, there are strong indications in the aid conditionality literature that donors might care relatively less about democracy in hybrid regimes than in more democratic ones, in part because the former tend to have resources or strategic advantages that matter more to them. 40 Hence, donor preferences might not be exogenous to a country's extraversion portfolio. In addition, it might intrinsically be harder for donors to monitor conditionality at mid-levels of democracy, facilitating hybrid consolidation. Table 3 indicates reasons to infer that hybrids might be less vulnerable to donor demands than their democratic counterparts. First, fewer of them were initially Soviet clients and thus fewer of them had to scramble to find new patrons. In contrast, more of them are in the French sphere of influence. French patronage after the initial transition has not been excessively sensitive to democratic conditions, which gives these regimes some room for manoeuvre. 41 Second, as during the transition, the ratio of aid to export revenue is considerably smaller for hybrids than it is for strong liberalizers. Finally, none of the strong liberalizers are significant oil producers whereas 29 percent of the hybrids are, providing the latter with some alternative source of revenues.
Access to revenue from the export of natural resources no doubt represents one of the most significant portfolio diversifications. Of the 17 hybrids, eight (Angola, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Niger, and Zambia) are large primary commodity producers. As in the initial transition period, these countries benefit from alternative sources of income aside from aid, which shield them from conditionality, irrespective of the direct negative effects that resource abundance per se might have on democracy. 42 Moreover, these regimes also have greater leverage in playing one patron off against another. In this respect, the argument that China's return to commodityrich African countries has lessened the leverage of Western donors in terms of governance has already been well debated.
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Diversification not only provides alternative sources of income for a regime, but also allows hybrid regimes to take advantage of the multiple interests that donors hold in their country. Put differently, regimes seem to exploit those elements that are of interest to outsiders and that can buffer them from more substantial democratic reforms. As much as they can, they shape their portfolios so as to maximize their domestic freedom.
As discussed for the transition period, donors might be intrinsically less committed to democracy in countries on which they depend for critical resources. 44 France's laissez-faire attitude towards Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon continued after the transition period. As a matter of fact, France was instrumental in the violent return to power in 1997 of Denis Sassou-Nguesso (the dictator earlier deposed by the democratic wave).
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One is also tempted to see a link between the announcement by President Sarkozy in Niamey of significant new French investments in Niger's uranium sector in March 2009 and President Mamadou Tandja's subsequent authoritarian drift (which led to his overthrow in February 2010).
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Donor countries are also increasingly torn between their desire for democracy and their interest in political stability, including containment of alleged terrorist threats. The 'war on terror' can become an object of extraversion. In this respect, the rise of the anti-terrorist agenda after 2001 has offered some African ruling elites ( particularly those of the Sahel region and of countries with large Muslim populations) a new venue for extraversion that has reduced the appeal and necessity of democratization. Cédric Jourde finds that Mauritania and Guinea actively 'enacted a series of performances such as the arrests of alleged "Islamists,""warlords," and other transnational "subversive threats," thereby framing their domestic and foreign policies in ways that can resonate with hegemonic international discourses, seeking to obtain either more support from Western states or to lower their democratization pressure (or both) '. 47 Similarly, the geopolitical importance of some hybrid regimes might be a source of leverage. Since the death of Côte d'Ivoire's President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso has been the new power broker of West Africa, an important relay of French foreign policy. France has also systematically courted the Angolan regime over the last decade, and Angola has been involved in civil wars in both the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo in support of France's clients. Ethiopia barely received a slap on the wrist following the large-scale violence in the wake of its botched 2005 elections, in part because it is the USA's main ally in the Horn of Africa against Islamic insurgent movements. The same argument also applies to quite a few of the stagnant authoritarian regimes. Western donors generally ignore Uganda's de facto one-party system because of the country's economic growth, success in fighting HIV, and its government's support in the 'war on terror'.
Sometimes it is the very consequences of democratization itself that become a concern for donors, taming their enthusiasm and demands, and leading them to be satisfied with the largely flawed elections that tend to characterize hybrid regimes. Stephen Brown's work on Kenya illustrates this point. 48 The 1997 elections, which followed the freezing of aid, were marred by irregularities. Although many donors documented them and concluded that the opposition should have won the polls, they suppressed this evidence and officially accepted the results, undermining the domestic democratic movement, for fear of the possible violence that could ensue from not endorsing the election.
In addition to the mixed motives of donors, there might be an intrinsic difference in how they value democracy as a function of the degree of a regime`s democracy. In other words, with democracy promotion an important dimension of foreign aid agendas since the early 1990s, donors might have too much at stake to contemplate failure among the strong democratizers. They are unwilling to see reversal in these countries, and ready to invest additional efforts to avoid it. In contrast, they have less at stake among hybrid regimes. They are satisfied for these countries to meet a minimum threshold of democracy, but it is not worth the effort to push for more, especially in view of the difficulties in making conditionality successful. 49 Hence, hybrid regimes face relatively little pressure to democratize further. They get away with some trappings of democracy, while the incumbents remain safely in control of the political process. Yet, they are not at liberty to revert completely to authoritarianism, either. Serious setbacks, like large-scale political violence against opponents or military coups, carry sanctions. For example, the United States suspended all but humanitarian aid after the Rajoelina takeover in Madagascar in March 2009. Similarly, France and the European Union applied an arms embargo after the Camara regime in Guinea killed some 150 opponents in a Conakry stadium in September 2009. France also sent troops to help overthrow Laurent Gbagbo in Côte d'Ivoire after his supporters unleashed murderous violence in the wake of his 2010 electoral loss. In contrast, the Democratic Republic of Congo has not faced significant consequences from its regime's progressive erosion of earlier democratic concessions, and the USA hardly complained about the scrambling of Voice of America by the Ethiopian government in 2010, both of which registered too low on the conditionality scale. The compatibility of hybridity with democratic extraversion is thus partly a matter of salience. Holding multi-party elections can be monitored easily and creates a presumption of relative democracy, even when they are not entirely free and fair. In between elections, it takes very significant backsliding to trigger aid sanctions.
50 Actual aid withdrawal is unlikely to happen unless regimes display dramatic and recognizable undemocratic behaviour, such as a coup or crimes against humanity.
51 As a result, hybridity has stable characteristics.
Empirical evidence
In this section, we use regression analysis to test the hypothesis that the vulnerability of extraversion portfolios is related to initial transitions and subsequent consolidations. In the first instance, our dependent variable is change in overall FH scores (civil liberties and political rights) between 1989 and 1995.
52 Multiple variables serve as proxy for Table 4 . The first model includes only the above extraversion variables. All of them come out significant in the expected direction. The Soviet effect is particularly strong: having been a Soviet client contributes a 1.82-point increase in the FH seven-point scale between 1989 and 1995. The French effect is about one third the size (0.6) and less significant but still positive. The magnitude of the foreign aid effect is not as large as that of the patronage dummies, but it is positive and statistically significant: a one-point increase in the aid-to-export ratio corresponds to a 0.11 increase in the FH score change. It should be borne in mind, however, that the average change in FH scores over that period is only 1.05. Finally, being a significant oil exporter contributes a 0.7 decrease in democratic performance. The overall model accounts for about one third of the cross-country variations in the initial transition.
To create the second model in Table 4 , we add control variables from other empirical studies of African democratization. We include a variable for the level of democracy in 1989. This is a convergence term which captures the fact that initially more democratic countries have less room for subsequent progress. We also include GDP per capita, 53 ethnic fractionalization, 54 protests, 55 regime legacy, 56 the number of years under one-party or no-party rule before the transition (which Robert Bates refers to as 'historisis'), 57 and the practice of elections. 58 Among these, only the convergence term, GDP, and past elections have a significant effect. 59 Three out of the four original extraversion variables remain significant, however. The Soviet effect is practically unchanged, but there is no longer any effect from being in the French sphere of influence. This is not necessarily surprising since, as we indicated earlier, France 53. As in Lindberg, Democracy; Lindberg, 'The power'; Goldsmith, 'Foreign aid'; Dunning, 'Conditioning'; and Kuenzi and Lambright, 'Party systems'. 54. As in Lindberg, Democracy; Lindberg, 'The power'; Goldsmith, 'Foreign aid'; and Dunning, 'Conditioning'. 55. As in Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments. 56. This variable refers to past experience with competition and participation, and is derived from Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments. 57. Bates, When Things Fell Apart. Bates finds that 'the longer a country has been subject to a no-or single party system, the less likely it is to change to a multiparty system' ( p. 163). 58. As in Lindberg, Democracy; Lindberg, 'The power'. 59. The elections coefficient is due at least in part to endogeneity: the dependent variable, the FH score, includes a measure of free and fair elections. When using civil liberties as a dependent variable, elections are no longer significant. maintained its presence as a source of patronage (unlike the Soviet Union) and its commitment to reform was always rather lukewarm and heterogeneous. The positive effects of foreign aid gain considerable statistical significance (largely because of the inclusion of per capita GDP), while oil rents gain both significance and magnitude, subtracting now as much as 1.6 from a country's transition score. This enlarged model accounts for almost two-thirds of the overall variation in initial transitions. By and large, then, the results in Table 4 support the argument that initial liberalization was in part a function of the vulnerability of countries' extraversion portfolios.
We turn to the consolidation period in Table 5 . Because we are mostly interested in the different levels of consolidation after the 1989-1995 transitions, we omit the group of 'consistent democrats', for which we had controlled in Table 4 with the inclusion of the convergence term, an option we do not have here since we are no longer measuring change. Instead, the dependent variable is the average value of the FH score between 1996 and 2011. We also change the time frame of other variables when necessary. The first model suggests that, with the exception of French patronage, the extraversion variables which accounted for the initial transition continue to carry explanatory power for the subsequent consolidation period. Having initially been a Soviet client contributes almost a full point on the FH scale; a one-point increase in the aid-to-export ratio adds 0.2 to the FH score; and being an oil exporter (there are eight of them in this period) lowers the score by 0.9. The lack of significant effect of the French dummy confirms that, apart from a brief moment in the early 1990s, being in the sphere zone of influence does not involve any particular pressure to democratize. This model accounts for 39 percent of the cross-country variation in levels of democracy.
In Model 2, we introduce the same control variables as with transitions, except protest. Bratton and van de Walle's measure of protests is available for the transition period only. The theoretical link between transition protest and subsequent consolidation is not as clear as that between protest and transition per se. When included, it has no significant effect, but it removes Zimbabwe from the sample, reducing its size to 39. Its inclusion decreases aid significance in Model 2 (but not in Model 3) because aid to Zimbabwe, a weak liberalizer, accounts for only 13 percent of exports. All the other control variables are included. Once again, the results show the robustness of the extraversion variables, which come out essentially unchanged from Model 1. This model accounts for 47 percent of the cross-country variation in levels of democracy.
We add a third model in Table 5 in order to revisit the path dependence of consolidation with respect to initial transition (see Figure 1 ). We do so by controlling in Model 3 for the extent to which the scope of the initial transition determines the subsequent level of democracy. In other words, we test for the degree to which countries really consolidate at whichever level of democracy they had reached by 1995. To avoid multi-collinearity, we first re-run the first model of Table 4 and use it to estimate the share of the transition not explained by the four extraversion variables in that model (the regression residual). We then include this residual in the third model. Doing so allows us to estimate separately the effects of the original transition while removing the overlapping influence of the extraversion variables. The results are telling: a one-point change in the original transition accounts for more than four tenths of a point in overall democratic variation over the 1996-2011 period. This result suggests that other uncaptured variables from the transition period continue to exercise an effect on the subsequent period and supports the view that both transitions and consolidations follow a similar logic. Including this variable reinforces the significance of the extraversion variables. The overall model accounts for 67 percent of the variation in levels of democracy.
Conclusions
We find evidence that variations in the vulnerability of extraversion portfolios of African countries correspond to variations in their degree of political liberalization. These effects appear robust to several controls. They suggest that there is a relationship between the internal dynamics of African regimes, such as political liberalization, and their situation of international dependence. This should not be construed as implying that political liberalization in Africa is mere lip service to donors. It is probably not more so than granting the Magna Carta was lip service to feudal barons. It does, however, suggest a displacement of accountability compared to more endogenous cases of democratization. Yet, at least for the more democratic countries, regime change does appear to endure.
While there is no intrinsic reason to believe that extraverted liberalization is less democratic than its endogenous counterpart, the evidence nevertheless suggests that, under current conditions, there might be a limit to the number of African countries likely to further democratize. Indeed, both African and donor dynamics conspire to infuse hybridity with equilibrium qualities likely to inhibit further democratization. It is possible, however, that current conditions will not last. The apparent rise of an African middle class might encourage more domestic democratizations in some countries. 60 Conversely, the increasing number of African countries exporting oil (including Ghana and São Tomé among the more democratic ones) and the rise of Chinese patronage might strengthen the extraversion portfolios of some regimes which have been until now among the most vulnerable to donors. Finally, the tendency of some donors to provide blanket budget support in exchange for broad policy commitments might weaken their effective leverage and loosen the linkage between aid and liberalization. 61 In a nutshell, while strategies of extraversion can produce multiple political outcomes, these tend to be stable as long as country portfolios and donor concerns also remain stable. Yet, with many African economies undergoing apparently dramatic changes and donors perceiving increased anti-Western threats on the continent, African regimes might be entering a more turbulent era than the last two decades. 
